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In April 1982, a Guatemalan busboy named Luis Marin went to
trial, accused of intentionally starting a fire that killed twenty-six people
at a Harrison, New York conference center. The evidence against de-
fendant Marin was purely circumstantial. The prosecution argued to
the jury that Marin was about to be fired for working under an assumed
name, and that he intended to set a small fire in order to emerge as a
hero and win back his job. Although the police did not find Marin with
any incriminating evidence, the prosecution introduced testimony from
co-workers to the effect that moments before the fire began Marin had
disappeared, and suggested in argument that he used gasoline from his
car to start the fire.'
The jury deliberated extensively. At one point during the delibera-
tions, they asked the judge to clarify whether "intent includes state of
* This research was supported by grant 80-12333 from the National Science Foundation
to Elizabeth Loftus and Laurence Severance. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of
Carla Iafrate, Wade Moberg, Kari Seeger, Barbara Johnson, Tim Seckel, and Debbie Pearce
in collecting data reported herein. We also acknowledge the help of Jane Goodman in
providing psycholinguistic analyses of protocol data reported herein.
** Attorney in private practice, Seattle. J.D., University of Washington, 1980; Ph.D.,
Duke University, 1974; B.A., University of California, Riverside, 1968.
*** Postdoctoral Research Associate, University of Washington. Ph.D., University of
Washington, 1983; M.A., University of Colorado, 1977; B.A., Stanford University, 1975.
**** Professor of Psychology, University of Washington. Ph.D., Stanford University, 1970;
B.A., U.C.L.A., 1966.
1 Newsweek, Apr. 26, 1982, at 59.
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mind, or what the accused was thinking" at the time.2 The jury eventu-
ally found Marin guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Four days after the
conviction, however, the judge overturned the jury's verdict, reasoning
that because the prosecution's case failed to negate other explanations
for the crime, the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support a
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
3
The Marin case illustrates the importance in criminal trials of the
jury's understanding legal instructions from the judge on concepts such
as "criminal intent" and "reasonable doubt." Where the jurors' under-
standing of these concepts differed from the judge's, opposite verdicts
were reached with obviously profound consequences for the defendant.
From a legal perspective, the judge's instructions are crucial infor-
mation intended to provide the jury with proper legal standards for
reaching a verdict. As one court stated:
The chief purpose of a charge is to aid the jury in clearly understand-
ing the case and in arriving at a correct verdict. If this is not done, there
can be no assurance that the verdict represents a finding by the jury under
the law and upon the evidence presented.
4
This Article begins with an analysis of some of the problems result-
ing from the necessary process of instructing jurors on the laws they
should apply to facts in reaching a verdict. We document a need for
jury instructions that are both understandable to lay people and legally
accurate. We then present the results of research aimed at improving
jurors' understanding of several key criminal jury instructions. The in-
structions on which we focused describe the concepts of reasonable
doubt, criminal intent, and the limited use of evidence of prior convic-
tions. We report a set of new instructions that were tested empirically
and found to be psychologically sound. These linguistically simplified
instructions and the existing pattern instructions on which they are
based were presented to a nationwide sample of trial judges for purposes
of comparison and assessment of their legal adequacy. We conclude the
Article with a discussion of the judges' reactions to the different versions
of each instruction.
A. THE CONCERN FOR LEGAL ACCURACY IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In formulating jury instructions, considerable controversy may
arise as to what constitutes an accurate statement of the law. Seemingly
minor changes in wording have been the basis of successful appeals. For
example, in People v. Garcia,5 a state appellate court cited a half dozen
2 N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1982, at 11.
3 Id.
4 Warren v. Parks, 31 N.C. App. 609, 612, 230 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1976) (citation omitted).
5 54 Cal. App. 3d 61, 126 Cal. Rptr. 275, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976).
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erroneous variations in jury instructions on the concept of "proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt" in reversing a defendant's conviction of sec-
ond degree murder on the ground of jury misinstruction. The court in
Garcia noted that "well intentioned efforts to 'clarify' and 'explain' rea-
sonable doubt criteria have had the result of creating confusion and un-
certainty, and have repeatedly been struck down by the courts of review
.... "6 Because appeals based on alleged error in instructing the jury
are common, 7 judges are often reluctant to deviate from language ap-
proved by higher courts, even where that language is difficult for the
jurors to understand.
In most jurisdictions, an important response to the problem of inac-
curate jury instructions has been the development of pattern instruc-
tions. Pattern jury instructions are statements of the law designed by
committees of judges and lawyers for presentation to jurors; depending
on the requirements of each individual trial, the court selects particular
pattern instructions for use.8 There is some evidence that pattern in-
structions reduce the number of reversals based on claims that the law
was incorrectly stated;9 however, a reliable effect of pattern instructions
in reducing the overall number of appeals has not been demonstrated.' 0
B. THE CONCERN FOR JUROR MISUNDERSTANDING OF JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
A second problem with jury instructions arises where instructions
that are technically accurate statements of the law are ambiguous or
misinterpreted by jurors. Misunderstanding can arise from the syntax of
the instructions, I" the manner of presentation, or the general unfamiliar-
ity of lay people with legal terminology.
A recent case illustrates the point. Defendant was driving a car, in
which his girlfriend was a passenger, when he ran into a parked car.
The two fled the scene on foot and were stopped within a few blocks by
the police. Defendant was charged with knowingly driving a stolen car.
At trial, his girlfriend testified that he did not know the car was stolen
until she told him at the time of the accident. The defendant testified
6 Id. at 63, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
7 See Nieland, Assessing the Impact of Pattern Jug' Instructions, 62 JUDICATURE 185, 188
(1978).
8 E.g., WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL (WPIC) (West 1977)
[hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRIMINAL]; CALIFORNIA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL: BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI) (P. Rich-
ards rev. 6th ed. 1977).
9 Nieland, supra note 7, at 194.
10 Id. at 190.
11 Syntax generally refers to sentence structure or the arrangement of words to show their
mutual relations in a sentence.
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that he was sick and too sleepy to notice details that would have indi-
cated that the car was stolen. The jury was instructed on the definition
of knowledge in statutory language:
Knowledge. A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:
(i) he is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a
statute defining an offense; or (ii) he has information which would lead a
reasonable man in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts
are described by a statute defining an offense.12
The jury convicted the defendant. He appealed, alleging that part (ii)
of the definition of knowledge was ambiguous because it could have led
the jury to conclude erroneously (a) that it might presume knowledge if
it found that a reasonable person would have known the car was stolen,
or (b) that the statute redefined knowledge to include the case where an
ordinary person in the defendant's situation would have known the car
was stolen. The Washington State Supreme Court agreed with the de-
fendant and reversed the conviction on the ground that both of these
interpretations of "knowledge" were incorrect; thus, the statute was suf-
ficiently ambiguous to "seriously infringe on the rights of the defendant,
if a juror used the wrong interpretation .... "13 Thus, pattern instruc-
tions that have been drafted to be legally accurate may fail to convey a
correct understanding of the law to jurors.
Pattern instructions also have been criticized for being too abstract.
Because they are written generally to apply in all cases, it can be argued
that they do not apply effectively to the facts of any case in particular.
In addition, the language of pattern instructions is often derived from
statutory language and case law definitions; thus, many pattern instruc-
tions still embody obvious linguistic difficulties.
Ideally, jury instructions should be both legally accurate and un-
derstandable to the jurors who hear them. The trend, however, has been
to emphasize legal accuracy rather than clarity. Consider for example,
the early position taken by the drafters of California's pattern instruc-
tions for criminal jury trials: "The one thing an instruction must do
above all else is correctly state the law. This is true regardless of who is
capable of understanding it."14 One appellate court actually discour-
aged a trial judge from presenting legal concepts to the jury in simpli-
fied language, although the simplified language was held not to misstate
the law.' 5 Other appellate courts, however, have acknowledged the im-
portance of clear language. For example, in People v. Wison, 16 an appel-
12 WASH. Ray. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010(l)(b) (1983).
13 State v. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d 510, 515, 610 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1980).
14 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL: BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS (BAJI) 44 (1950).
15 See Davis v. State, 373 So. 2d 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
16 258 Cal. App. 2d 578, 65 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1968).
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late court reversed a trial jury's decision where the judge had given
pattern instructions instead of using "concrete and direct language de-
fining the rather simple issues of fact which the case presented."' 7 The
court stated further:
Form [pattern] instructions . . . can be of great value to the judge in
preparing his charge to the jury, but it is a misuse of these resources to read
to the jury a lengthy and confusing incantation made up of form instruc-
tions submitted by the parties.18
C. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTIES FOR JURORS
Recent social science research suggests that jurors' difficulties in un-
derstanding instructions on the law are considerable and widespread.
Strawn and Buchanan assessed juror comprehension of oral criminal
pattern instructions used in Florida by comparing the understanding of
subject-jurors who received instructions to that of a comparable group
of subjects that did not receive instructions.' 9 They found that although
the instructions helped to some extent,20 the instructed jurors still missed
27% of the test items and failed to show any improved comprehension
for four of nine crucial content areas addressed by the instructions. 2'
Elwork, Sales, and Alfini studied Michigan civil pattern instructions on
the law of negligence and found no reliable differences between a group
receiving no instructions and a group receiving the pattern instruc-
tions.2 2 More recently, on the basis of further extensive testing, these
researchers concluded that prior to deliberating on a defendant's guilt or
innocence, the average juror may understand only about half of the le-
gal instructions presented by the judge.23 From this they concluded that
many verdicts in criminal jury trials reflect misunderstandings of the
juror's role in the process and of what the law requires.
These data corroborate the subjective impressions of the judges and
commentators. One Oregon trial judge stated, for example, "When I
read instructions to the jury, I hope that I will see a light go on in the
17 Id. at 585, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
18 Id.
19 Strawn & Buchanan, Jugy Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976).
20 For example, 77% of instructed jurors understood that the effect of a not guilty plea is
to require the state to prove the charges against the defendant, id. at 481; and 66% of in-
structed jurors knew that a statement made by a defendant could not be considered as evi-
dence against him unless it was freely and voluntarily made, id.
21 Id. at 482. Instructed jurors failed to comprehend the meaning of "reasonable doubt,"
"information," "material allegation," and "breaking and entering" any better than the con-
trol group of jurors that had received no instructions. Id.
22 Elwork, Sales & Alfini,Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of lt? I LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 163, 163 (1977).




jurors' eyes, but I never do."'24
D. IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS IN NEED OF REFINEMENT
l. Archival Data
Evidence confirming the difficulties jurors have understanding
judges' instructions has been derived from a systematic analysis of the
questions jurors asked of judges during the course of their delibera-
tions.2 5 In an earlier study,26 we reviewed court records of jury trials in
nineteen superior courts in the State of Washington, noting all instances
where the jury, during the course of its deliberation, sent written
messages to the judge and the judge responded. Such questions and
answers were included in the trial court's record and thus were accessi-
ble as public records. From the records of 405 jury trials, including both
civil and criminal actions, we found that about one quarter of these
juries submitted written questions. In many instances, jurors who had
received the recommended pattern instructions sought further clarifica-
tion. For example, one submitted item stated, "We are 11-1, one person
feels they need a better definition of intent." Other juries had questions
about "reasonable doubt": "We request further clarification of 'reason-
able doubt' as it pertains to credibility of the witnesses," and "Can rea-
sonable doubt apply to the jury as a whole and not'just to individual
jurors?" Invariably, the judges refused to paraphrase or offer an alter-
native explanation for the problematic instructions. In nearly all in-
stances, judges simply referred the jurors back to the problematic
instructions for rereading.
27
Not all sources of misunderstanding can be identified by analyzing
the questions juries ask because jurors sometimes think they have under-
stood instructions when in fact they have not.28 Nevertheless, our earlier
research into the patterns of questions asked by jurors29 has identified
certain criminal jury instructions that, regardless of their legal impor-
tance and virtually universal application, are difficult for jurors to
comprehend.
First, jurors had difficulty understanding instructions on "reason-
able doubt" and the closely linked concept of "presumption of inno-
24 Personal oral communication to L. Severance (Oct. 3, 1980).
25 An implicit assumption here is that jurors' questions correspond to their lack of under-
standing about a certain legal issue.
26 Severance & Loftus, Improving the Abiliy ofJurors to Comprehend and Apply CriminalJugr
Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 153 (1982).
27 Id. at 172.
28 See O'Mara & von Eckartsberg, AoposedStandardJugy Instncions-Evaluation of Usage and
Understanding, 48 PA. BAR A.Q. 542, 550 (1977).
29 Severence & Loftus, supra note 26.
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cence." Second, deliberating juries were left with questions about the
meaning of "intent" even after receiving a pattern instruction defining
the concept.30 For many crimes, "intent" is a mental state that must be
proven to find guilt: a person is not found guilty of a crime unless the
admitted acts were committed with the requisite intent, i.e., the intent
to accomplish an illegal result.3 ' The obvious difficulties with this con-
cept made instructions concerning "intent" a natural choice for closer
examination.
The third problem on which we chose to focus arises when jurors
hear evidence in court and then are instructed to limit their considera-
tion of that evidence to a certain purpose. For example, a frequently
used limiting instruction concerns evidence of prior convictions. Where
a defendant's prior convictions are admitted into evidence, the jury nor-
mally is instructed to consider the prior convictions solely to evaluate
the credibility of the defendant as a witness and not as evidence of a
propensity to commit crimes such as the one charged. The Federal
Rules of Evidence, along with many state jurisdictions, permit evidence
of prior convictions to be admitted under certain circumstances.
32
Based in part on the questions asked by jurors on this issue, we selected
limiting instructions on the use of prior convictions for further study.
30 Id. at 170-71. For example, the Washington pattern instruction given to juries when
"intent" is an element of an alleged crime states: "A person acts with intent or intentionally
when acting with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime."
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRIMINAL, supra note 8, at 10.01. See Table
1 infra.
31 For example, Washington Pattern Jury Instruction 35.02 listing the elements of first
degree assault reads in part:
To convict the defendant of the crime of assault in the first degree, each of the following
elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about the - day of - ., 19-, the defendant assaulted
(2) That the assault was committed [with a firearm] [or] [with a deadly weapon] [or] [by
a force or means likely to produce death];
(3) That the defendant acted with intent [to kill a human being] [or] [to commit
upon the [person] [or] [property] of the person assaulted, or another]; and
(4) That the acts occurred in County, Washington.
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRIMINAL, supra note 8, at 35.02 (bracketed
material in original).
32 Federal Rule of Evidence 609 provides in part:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
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2 Experimental Analysis of Specftc Pattern Instructions
The pioneering work of Strawn and Buchanan33 and Elwork, Sales,
and Alfini 34 suggested that an empirical approach could be used effec-
tively to pinpoint comprehension difficulties in specific jury instructions.
Building on this earlier work, in our previous study we presented an
hour-long videotaped burglary trial to a group of college students who
were eligible for jury duty.35 The tape was followed by either (a) no
instructions, (b) general pattern instructions concerning the jury's du-
ties,36 but excluding any specific instructions, or (c) general pattern in-
structions plus three additional specific pattern instructions pertaining
to "reasonable doubt," "intent," and restrictions on the use of evidence
concerning prior convictions.3
7
The videotaped trial was an enactment, filmed in an actual court-
room with a real judge and credible actors as witnesses. The facts were
intentionally balanced so that the defendant's guilt or innocence was
unclear. The defendant had one prior conviction to which he admitted
during cross-examination.3 8
After observing the videotaped trial and hearing one of the sets of
instructions, half of the participants were instructed to deliberate for up
to thirty minutes; the others were not. Thereafter, each subject an-
swered a questionnaire designed to measure comprehension and ability
to apply the legal concepts embodied in the instructions.
a. The questionnaire
The subjects were asked to give a verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty"
and then indicate how certain they were that their verdict was correct.
We employed two different measures of jurors' understanding. First, we
examined their ability to comprehend the meaning of instructions
through the use of multiple choice questions that required the respon-
dent to distinguish between correct and incorrect expressions of an in-
struction's meaning. There were separate sets of items probing the
"reasonable doubt/presumption of innocence" instruction, the "intent"
33 Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 19.
34 Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 22.
35 Severance & Loftus, supra note 26.
36 Instructions on the three critical legal concepts obviously are not given in isolation.
Judges invariably instruct juries on their general duties and they often refer back to those
general instructions when trying to clarify deliberating jurors' confusion. See sura note 27
and accompanying text.
37 Pattern instructions were those developed for jurors in criminal trials in the State of
Washington. See WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, sura note 8.
38 Thanks are extended to Dr. Barbara Hart, of the University of Texas, who made the
videotape available for our research.
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instruction, the limiting instruction, and the general instructions. 39
Second, we assessed the subjects' abilities to apply jury instructions
correctly to novel fact patterns. Subjects were presented with a series of
single paragraph descriptions of factual situations.40 They responded to
each paragraph by indicating on a scale ranging from -3 (Strongly Disa-
gree) to +3 (Strongly Agree) whether they concurred with a proposed
solution at the end of the factual situation. Each example tested their
abilities to apply concepts embodied in the pattern instructions correctly
in order to reach a legally accurate decision.
b. Findings
For the "comprehension" measures, subjects who received no in-
structions erred 35.6% of the time; subjects with general pattern instruc-
tions erred 34.7% of the time; and subjects with general plus specific
pattern instructions erred 29.6% of the time.4 1 "Reasonable
doubt/presumption of innocence" was the only concept for which a spe-
cific pattern instruction was helpful. For this instruction, there was a
comprehension error rate of 32.1% with no instructions, 34% with the
general instruction only, but 26.2% with general plus specific
instructions.
4 2
39 An example of a comprehension measure for "intent" is the following: Intent to com-
mit a crime:
(a) cannot be proved without the testimony of a psychologist;
(b) cannot be proved since it rests within a person's mind;
(c) is assumed whenever a crime is committed;
(d) can be proved when a person acts with a clear purpose.
In the example, (d) is the correct answer.
40 An example of an "application" test item for reasonable doubt/presumption of inno-
cence is the following:
A used car dealer claims that the accused hot wired one of his cars and drove it to the
ocean 200 miles away, where it was found the next day. The accused has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not in the vicinity at the time of the
alleged crime, nor ever in the stolen car.
41 F (2,210) = 5.04, p < .007. Throughout this Article, reference will be made to the
notion of "statistical significance." Statistical significance is a term that implies that the like-
lihood that two measurements differ by chance is less than some acceptable level. In most
social science research the minimum acceptable level is .05, represented as p < .05. This
figure means that the probability that the statistical event being measured'(for example, an
improvement in comprehension) occurred by chance is less than 1 in 20 (5/100). Thus, p <
.007 means that the probability that these comprehension scores could have resulted by
chance and were not due to our experimental manipulations is less than 7 in 1000. For an
explanation of the various basic methods of computing statistical significance, see A. ED-
WARDS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 132-35 (3d ed. 1969). The F test or Fisher ratio is used to
determine whether two or more samples differ significantly: the larger the F ratio, the larger
the level of significance. The number within the parentheses indicate the number of "degrees
of freedom" associated with the Fisher ratio. For an explanation of the concept of degrees of
freedom, see A. EDWARDS, supra, at 142.
42 F (2,210) = 4.03, p < .02.
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For the "application" measures, subjects tended to agree with the
correct applications of the law more strongly when specific instructions
had been given than when they had not. 43 When the effects of individ-
ual specific instructions were analyzed separately, however, the specific
instruction on "intent" actually diminished agreement with the correct
application of the law, relative to no instructions and to the general pat-
tern instruction only.44 The specific instruction concerning reasonable
doubt/presumption of innocence had no significant effect on subjects'
application abilities.45 In fact, the limiting instruction was the only spe-
cific instruction that seemed to aid subjects in correctly applying the
law.
4 6
Taken together, these results demonstrated that people without le-
gal training have difficulty comprehending and applying pattern in-
structions. Even with those instructions, the overall error rate for the
comprehension measures was 29.6%, and the overall level of agreement
with correct applications of the instructions was not significantly differ-
ent from the level of agreement given no instructions at all. None of the
results were affected reliably by the presence or absence of deliberation
prior to subjects' answering the questionnaire.
II. IMPROVING THE CLARITY OF CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
From a psychological perspective, the work of Elwork, Sales, and
Alfini47 and Charrow and Charrow48 has suggested that specific
psycholinguistic principles can be applied to jury instructions to elimi-
nate problematic language, simplify meaning, and present instructions
in a clear, logical way. From a legal perspective, however, the large
number of verdicts that are reversed for error because of incorrect jury
instructions suggests the potential folly of altering existing pattern in-
structions too dramatically.
In rewriting existing pattern instructions to improve juror under-
standing,49 we applied a range of specific principles that had been tested
with success in other contexts.5 0 We tried to eliminate legal jargon and
uncommon words on the assumption that people have more difficulty
43 F (2,210) = 4.01, p <.02.
44 F (2,210) = 2.99, p <.05.
45 F (2,210) = 0.85, n.s.
46 F (2,210) = 5.77, p < .004.
47 Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 22, at 176; J. ALFINI, B. SALES & A. ELWORK, supra
note 23, at 171.
48 Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A. Psycholinguirtic Study of
Jug Instruetions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1307-08 (1979).
49 See Severance & Loftus, supra note 26.
50 See supra notes 22-23, 47-48 and accompanying text. Charrow and Charrow's influen-
tial research suggested that jurors' ability to correctly paraphrase their instructions was en-
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perceiving, remembering, and comprehending unfamiliar words. We
also replaced abstract words with more concrete ones and avoided using
homonyms (similar sounding words with more than one meaning). We
made changes in grammar to avoid compound sentences5' and awk-
ward, passive constructions.
52
To insure a logical structuring of the paragraphs, we used both hi-
erarchical and algorithmic organizing principles. In a hierarchical
structure, high-level concepts are broken down into their lower-level
components and then integrated. According to the algorithmic method
of structuring, ideas are presented so that an understanding of any par-
ticular idea follows from the understanding of previous ideas.
Some of the revisions we made were directly responsive to our anal-
ysis of subjects' errors in comprehending the pattern instructions. For
example, with regard to "intent," many subjects (29%) indicated doubts
that a mental state such as intent could ever be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt, even though the law clearly requires this finding for convic-
tion. We made certain changes in order to reduce this type of apparent
confusion.
We next submitted the rewritten instructions to legal scholars in
order to validate the legality of the revised instructions. 53 Further
changes were made to satisfy their concerns. The results of our efforts,
instructions with improvements that were still legally sound according
to our legal experts, became the focus of empirical investigation. These
hanced considerably when certain linguistic features that impede comprehension were
eliminated. The major psycholinguistic principles they applied included:
(1) substituting active voice for passive voice, Charrow & Charrow, supra note 48, at
1325-26;
(2) inserting "whiz" phrases ("which is . . ." or "that is.) where needed, id. at
1323-24;
(3) eliminating multiple negatives, id. at 1324-25;
(4) reorganizing sentences to properly locate misplaced phrases and eliminate compli-
cated embedding, id. at 1323, 1327-28;
(5) reducing item lists and strings to no more than two, where possible, id. at 1326;
(6) using directives such as "must," "should," and permissives such as "may" to help
focus the jurors' attention, id. at 1324;
(7) replacing uncommon words with ones that are more common in the language, id. at
1324; and
(8) rearranging existing instructions into a more logical organization, id. at 1326-27.
51 For example, the sentence, "Such evidence may be considered by you in deciding what
weight or credibility should be given to the testimony of the defendant and for no other
purpose," was broken into two parts: "You may not use this evidence in deciding whether he
or she is guilty or innocent. You may use evidence of prior convictions only to decide whether
to believe the defendant's testimony and how much weight to give it." See inra Table 1.
52 For example, the phrase "you have an abiding belief in the truth of the charge. .
was replaced by "you believe in the truth of the charge .... " See infra Table 1.
53 Professor John Junker and former Superior Court Judge and Professor Charles Z.
Smith, both of the University of Washington School of Law, provided legal insight in devel-
oping revised instructions.
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instructions appear in Table 1, side by side with pattern jury
instructions.
TABLE 1
EXAMPLES OF PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR
REVISED COUNTERPARTS
Topic Pattern Instruction Revised Instruction
Use of Prior Evidence that the defendant Evidence that the defendant
Conviction has previously been convicted has previously been convicted
to Impeach of a crime is not evidence of of a crime is not evidence of
a Defend- the defendant's guilt. Such ev- the defendant's guilt in this
ant idence may be considered by case. You may not use this evi-
you in deciding what weight or dence in deciding whether he
credibility should be given to or she is guilty or innocent.
the testimony of the defendant You may use evidence of prior
and for no other purpose. convictions only to decide
whether to believe the defend-
ant's testimony and how much
weight to give it.
Intent A person acts with intent A person acts with intent or
or intentionally when acting intentionally when he or she
with the objective or purpose acts with the objective or pur-
to accomplish a result which pose to accomplish a result
constitutes a crime, that is a crime. It is possible to
prove intent beyond a reason-
able doubt by either direct or
circumstantial evidence.
Burden of The defendant has entered a The defendant has entered a
Proof; Pre- plea of not guilty. That plea plea of not guilty. That plea
sumption of puts in issue every element of puts in issue every element of
Innocence; the crime charged. The plain- the crime charged. The de-
Reasonable tiff has the burden of proving fendant is presumed to be in-
Doubt each element of the crime be- nocent and is not required to
yond a reasonable doubt. A prove his or her innocence or
defendant is presumed inno- any fact. This presumption of
cent. This presumption con- innocence is present at the be-
tinues throughout the entire ginning of the trial and contin-
trial unless you find it has been ues unless you decide after
overcome by the evidence be- hearing all the evidence that
yond a reasonable doubt. there is proof beyond a reason-
a In State v. Walker, 19 Wash. App. 881, 884, 578 P.2d 83, 85 (1978), additional language in
the pattern instruction stating, "You are not to consider doubts that are unreasonable or
which are unsupported by evidence or lack of evidence," was found by the court there to be
unnecessarily confusing, although the language was not held to be erroneous.
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TABLE 1--Continued
Pattern Instruction
A reasonable doubt is one
for which a reason exists.a A
reasonable doubt is such a
doubt as would exist in the
mind of a reasonable person
after fully, fairly and carefully
considering all of the evidence
or lack of evidence. If, after
such consideration, you have
an abiding belief in the truth
of the charge, you are satisfied









It is your duty to determine
the facts in this case from the
evidence produced in court. It
is also your duty to accept the
law from the court, regardless
of what you personally believe
the law is or ought to be. You
are to apply the law to the
facts and in this way decide
the case.
The order in which these in-
structions are given has no sig-
nificance as to their relative
importance. The attorneys
may properly discuss any spe-
cific instructions they think are
particularly significant. You
As jurors in this case, you
have several duties: First, it is
your duty to determine the
facts in this case from the evi-
dence produced in court; Sec-
ond, it is your duty to accept
the law as I will instruct you,
regardless of what you person-
ally believe the law is or ought
to be; Third, to reach a ver-
dict, you are to apply the law
to the facts and in this way de-
cide the case.
With regard to your duty to
determine the facts in this case,
the evidence you are to consid-
er consists of the testimony of
Revised Instruction
able doubt that the defendant
is guilty. The state has the
burden of proving each ele-
ment of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt about
guilt is not a vague or specula-
tive doubt but is a doubt for
which a reason exists. A rea-
sonable doubt is a doubt that
would exist in the mind of a
reasonable person after that
person has fully, fairly and
carefully considered all of the
evidence or lack of evidence.
If, after such thorough consid-
eration, you believe in the
truth of the charge, you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt.
If you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that all ele-
ments of the charge have been
proved, then you must find the
defendant guilty. However, if
you are left with a reasonable
doubt about the proof of any
element, then you must find















should consider the instruc-
tions as a whole and should
not place undue emphasis on
any particular instruction or
part thereof.
The information in this case
is only an accusation against
the defendant which informs
the defendant of the charge.
You are not to consider the fil-
ing of the information or its
contents as proof of the mat-
ters charged.
The evidence you are to con-
sider consists of the testimony
of the witnesses and the exhib-
its admitted into evidence. It
has been my duty to rule on
the admissibility of evidence.
You must not concern your-
selves with the reasons for
these rulings. You will disre-
gard any evidence which either
was not admitted or which was
stricken by the court.
In determining whether any
proposition has been proved,
you should consider all of the
evidence introduced by all par-
ties bearing on the question.
Every party is entitled to the
benefit of the evidence whether
produced by that party or by
another party.
You are the sole judges of
the credibility of the witnesses
and of what weight is to be
given the testimony of each.
In considering the testimony of
any witness, you may take into
account the opportunity and
ability of the witness to ob-
serve, the witness' memory and
manner while testifying, any
interest, bias, or prejudice the
witness may have, the reasona-
bleness of the testimony of the
Revised Instruction
the witnesses and exhibits
which I have admitted into ev-
idence. You must not concern
yourselves with the reasons for
these rulings. You will disre-
gard any evidence which either
was not admitted or which was
stricken by me. In determin-
ing what facts have been
proved, you should consider all
of the admitted evidence. Eve-
ry party is entitled to the bene-
fit of all the evidence, whether
produced by that party or by
another party.
The law does not permit me
to express my views about the
facts or evidence in any way
and I have not intentionally
done so. The law also does not
permit me to try to influence
your judgment as to the believ-
ability or credibility of
witnesses.
You are the sole judges of
the credibility of the witnesses
and of what weight is to be
given to the testimony of each.
In evaluating the testimony of
any witness, you may take into
account the following factors:
the opportunity and ability of
the witness to observe the facts;
the accuracy of the witness'
memory; the witness' manner
while testifying; any interest in
the case or bias or prejudice
the witness may have shown;
the reasonableness of the wit-
ness' testimony considered in
light of all the evidence; and
any other factors that bear on
believability and weight. If it
appears to you that I have ex-
pressed my opinion concerning
the evidence or the witnesses at
any time, you must disregard








witness considered in light of
all the evidence, and any other
factors that bear on believabil-
ity and weight.
Counsel's remarks, state-
ments and arguments are in-
tended to help you understand
the evidence and apply the
law. They are not evidence,
however, and you should disre-
gard any remark, statement or
argument which is not sup-
ported by the evidence or the
law as given to you by the
court.
The lawyers have the right
and the duty to make any ob-
jections which they deem ap-
propriate. Such objections
should not influence you, and
you should make no presump-
tion because of objections by
counsel.
The law does not permit me
to comment on the evidence in
any way, and I have not inten-
tionally done so. If it appears
to you that I have so comment-
ed, during either the trial or
the giving of these instructions,
you must disregard such com-
ment entirely.
You have nothing whatever
to do with the punishment to
be inflicted in case of a viola-
tion of law. The fact that pun-
ishment may follow conviction
cannot be considered by you
except insofar as it may tend to
make you careful.
You are officers of the court
and must act impartially and
with an earnest desire to deter-
mine and declare the proper
verdict. Throughout your de-




With regard to your duty to
accept the law as I will instruct
you, you should consider the
instructions as a whole and
should not place undue em-
phasis on any particular in-
struction or part of an instruc-
tion. The order in which the
instructions are given has no
significance as to their relative
importance. The lawyers may
properly discuss any specific
instructions they think are par-
ticularly significant.
With regard to your duty to
apply the law, the fact that the
defendant has been charged is
only an accusation. You are
not to consider the filing of a
written charge or its contents
as proof of the matters
charged. The lawyer's re-
marks, statement and argu-
ments are intended to help you
understand the evidence and
apply the law. They are not
evidence, however, and you
should disregard any remark,
statement or argument that is
not supported by the evidence
or by my instructions on the
law.
The lawyers have the right
and the duty to make any ob-
jections which they think are
appropriate. Such objections
should not influence you, and
you should make no presump-
tion because of objections by
the lawyers.
You have nothing whatever
to do with the punishment in
case of a violation of law. The
fact that punishment may fol-
low conviction cannot be con-




Topic Pattern Instruction Revised Instruction
General In- prejudice to influence you. may tend to make you careful.
troductory Throughout your delibera-
Instruction tions you will permit neither
(continued) sympathy nor prejudice to in-
fluence you. You are officers
of the court and must act im-
partially and with an earnest
desire to determine and de-
clare the proper verdict.
To reach a verdict, your de-
cision must be unanimous.
Our first test of the new instructions compared the responses of sub-
jects who viewed the videotaped trial used in our previous study and
then received either no instructions, general plus specific pattern instruc-
tions, or revised versions of those same instructions. The same question-
naire measures were taken as in the prior study.
The results showed consistently more accurate responses with the
revised instructions. Most importantly, we found that revised instruc-
tions led subjects to endorse more strongly the correct applications of the
targeted legal concepts than did pattern instructions or no instruc-
tions.54 Comprehension was also improved, with subjects who received
revised instructions averaging 20.3% errors in comparison to 29.3% with
no instructions and 24.3% with pattern instructions. 55 Although the
overall difference between revised and pattern instructions did not reach
statistical significance for the multiple choice comprehension measures,
the pattern of results for each of the individual concepts was consistent
in showing lowest error rates with revised instructions.
5 6
The experimental studies described above were conducted in a uni-
versity setting with students who were registered voters, and thus eligi-
ble for jury duty, serving as subjects. In order to demonstrate the utility
of these revisions for actual jurors, the next step was to move our re-
search into a more generalizable setting.
III. TESTING THE ADVANTAGES OF REVISED LANGUAGE
ON ACTUAL JURORS
To obtain a test population more representative of real juries, we
54 F (2,210) = 8.15, p < .001.
55 F (2,210) = 8.65, p < .001.
56 See Severance & Loftus, supra note 26, at 190, Table 6.
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approached the Washington state court system for assistance.5 7 After
reviewing the procedures we had used in testing student subjects, the
court administrator and judges of the superior courts for the State of
Washington allowed us to test two important populations: persons who
had been selected and who had reported for jury duty in the past, and
persons who were currently serving as jurors and awaiting assignment to
courtrooms of the King County Superior Courts in Seattle,
Washington.
58
A. OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
Persons who had served previously as jurors (ex-jurors) and persons
who were currently on jury duty (current jurors) were shown the same
videotaped burglary trial that we used in the earlier studies with college
students. They then heard either (a) pattern instructions pertaining to
reasonable doubt, intent, restrictions on use of evidence of prior convic-
tions, and general instructions outlining the jurors' duties, or (b) our
revised versions of these same instructions (see Table 1). These were the
same variations we tested previously with college students. Since actual
jurors are always given instructions at the close of trial, the no instruc-
tion condition was not included in this experimental design. After
watching the trial and hearing the instructions, half of the participants
deliberated to reach a verdict and the other half gave individual ver-
dicts. All subjects completed questionnaires designed to measure their
57 We are particularly indebted to the Honorable Francis E. Holman and to King County
Superior Court Administrator Robert Cannon and Assistant Court Administrator Michael
Cason for their cooperation and assistance in implementing this research.
58 Ex-jurors in our study were randomly selected from lists of jurors who had served on
jury duty in King County, Washington between February and September 1981. In all, 445
ex-jurors were contacted by mail and asked to participate in a study of jury behavior. Two
hundred fifty-seven (64%) of those contacted agreed to participate. Ex-jurors' reluctance to
participate appeared to be closely tied to the distance they were asked to travel to our testing
location at the University of Washington. Those ex-jurors who actually participated may
have had a higher degree of interest in jury duty than those who chose not to participate.
One hundred sixty-two ex-jurors were contacted by telephone and actually participated
in the research. These subjects participated in groups of three or more, but in all cases there
were six persons on each deliberating jury. A total of 72 ex-jurors deliberated (36 heard
pattern instructions; 36 heard revised instructions). Ninety did not deliberate (40 heard pat-
tern instructions; 50 heard revised instructions).
Among current jurors, there was a much higher rate of participation. Jurors in King
County serve for a two-week period and during this time, they may or may not be selected
for actual juries. Therefore, a considerable amount of time is spent awaiting assignment to a
courtroom. These persons seemed interested in participating in our research rather than just
waiting. We solicited subjects from those waiting and had 100% participation. In all, 144
current jurors participated in our research. Thirty-six persons participated in each of the four
conditions (receiving either pattern or revised jury instructions, then either deliberating or not
deliberating). All current jurors observed the videotaped trial while sitting in the jury box of
an actual courtroom. Those who deliberated retired to the adjacent jury room to deliberate.
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comprehension of the instructions and ability to apply the concepts em-
bodied therein. Each of the four possible combinations (pattern or re-
vised instructions and deliberation or no deliberation) was presented
both to ex-jurors and to current jurors.
B. PROCEDURE
All participants in the study were told that they would be viewing a
videotaped trial from another jurisdiction, after which they would hear
instructions from a judge and then would be asked to reach a verdict.
They were told further that we would be comparing their reactions to
those of the jurors at the actual trial in order to evaluate the use of
videotaped trial materials. This procedure was intended to encourage all
participants to behave as actual jurors and take their roles seriously.
At the close of the trial and after the judge's instructions, partici-
pants were randomly divided into two groups. Each group was inde-
pendently assigned to deliberate or not. Those in the deliberating
groups were escorted to a conference room (ex-jurors) or jury room (cur-
rent jurors), asked to choose a foreperson, given one written set of the
judge's instructions they had heard,5 9 and asked to notify the experi-
menter when a verdict had been reached. They were left to deliberate
for up to thirty minutes. After reaching a verdict, each participant was
given a questionnaire to complete. Participants in the no deliberation
group were given the questionnaire immediately following the video-
taped trial and judge's instructions. These people were not provided
with a written set of the judge's instructions.
C. QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire first elicited a verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty"
and then asked subjects to indicate how certain they were that their
verdict was correct. Next, thirty multiple choice questions measured
comprehension of the targeted concepts embodied in the instructions,
and ten items measured jurors' ability to apply those concepts to novel
fact situations. These questions were identical to those used in the ear-
lier work testing college students. All jurors were also asked to give their
subjective impressions of the judge's instructions, i.e., how effective the
instructions were in helping them to understand the law. Jurors who
deliberated were asked several questions about the deliberation process:
how much they had participated in the discussion; how they would rate
the overall quality of the deliberation; how much discussion of the
59 The standard practice in the State of Washington is for attorneys to submit two copies
of their proffered instructions to the judge. One copy, containing citations, is for the judge's
perusal; the second copy is routinely sent into the jury room.
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judge's instructions they would have preferred. All jurors were given the
additional task of defining in their own words the legal concepts of "rea-
sonable doubt" and "intent," and were asked to indicate the legally
proper way to use evidence of prior convictions. Finally, demographic
information (i.e., age, ethnicity, and amount of jury experience) was ob-
tained for all jurors.
D. RESULTS
1. Comparison of Ex-jurors and Current Jurors
The responses of ex-juror subjects and current juror subjects dif-
fered in several ways that affected our interpretation of the other results.
First, the ex-jurors who participated in our research were significantly
more experienced with jury duty than were current juror subjects. As
indicated in Table 2, our ex-juror sample had been called to jury duty,
had been assigned to a courtroom for the jury selection process, and had
actually served on juries more than had our current jurors. While it is
possible that the experience of the Current jurors would have been more
similar to ex-jurors by the time their jury duty was completed, at the
time that they participated in our research there were significant differ-
ences in the degree of experience between the two samples.
TABLE 2
DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND EXPERIENCE OF EX-JUROR
AND COURTHOUSE JUROR PARTICIPATION IN THE
RESEARCH
Subject Sample
Ex-Jurors Current Jurors Statistical
Individual Characteristic (n = 162) (n = 144) Significance
Age 48.7 yrs. 43.3 yrs. p = .004
Years of education 14.6 yrs. 13.8 yrs. p = .006
Number of times on jury 2.00 1.46 p = .001
duty
Number of times assigned 3.25 1.95 p = .001
to a courtroom for the
jury selection process
Number of civil trials 0.53 0.60 p = .462
actually served on




Second, ex-jurors were significantly older and more educated than
Current jurors. These differences, also summarized in Table 2, support
the idea that those ex-jurors who agreed to take the time to participate
in our research were to some degree self-selected in terms of their interest
in juries and jury duty. Current jurors and ex-jurors did not differ in
overall ethnic composition.
Although the experiments took place in an actual court setting for
one group (current jurors) and in a university conference room for the
others (ex-jurors), all subjects seemed to take the procedure seriously.
Thus, we believe that differences between the two groups' responses are
due largely to experiential and demographic factors rather than setting.
2. Verdicts
Overall, 35.5% of our subjects found the defendant guilty and
64.5% found him not guilty. The effects on verdicts of instructions, op-
portunity to deliberate, and setting are summarized in Table 3. These
results demonstrate two significant effects. First, the Current jurors were
more lenient than Ex- jurors, with only 28.5% of the former voting to
convict as compared to 41.3% of the latter.6 0 Second, those jurors who
deliberated were less likely to find the defendant guilty than were the
jurors who did not have an opportunity to deliberate, as 28.4% of those
TABLE 3










No Deliberation 40 44
Deliberation 22a 0 8b
Note: Row values with different superscripts differ at .05 level of
significance.
60 Z = 2.37, p < .02. The Z-test is a statistical test for determining whether the difference
between two proportions is statistically significant. For an explanation of the Z-test, see J.
BRUNING & B. Kim-z, COMPUTATIONAL HANDBOOK OF STATIsTIcs 199-201 (1968).
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who deliberated voted to convict as compared to 41.3% of those who did
not deliberate.6 ' Variations in the instructions did not affect verdicts
significantly.
All jurors were asked to indicate how certain they were of their
verdicts on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 = Extremely uncertain, and 7 =
Extremely certain. Only one variable seemed important here: current
jurors were significantly more certain of their verdicts (x = 4.91) than
were ex-jurors (x = 3.09).62
3. Comprehension Measures
On the thirty multiple choice questions designed to assess jurors'
understanding of the law as defined in the instructions, ex-jurors demon-
strated better comprehension (21.4% errors over all thirty questions)
than current jurors (26.1%).63 For two of the individual instructions, the
distinction between current and ex-jurors was also significant. For ques-
tions dealing specifically with the intent instruction, there were 33% er-
rors for ex-jurors, and 39% errors for current jurors.64 For questions that
concerned jurors' general duties, the error rate for ex-jurors was 6%, and
for jurors tested during jury duty, 11%.65 All of these differences may be
due to the different demographic characteristics and jury experience of
our two samples.
Based on our earlier work with college students, we anticipated that
regardless of whether or not jurors deliberated, the revised instructions
would enhance comprehension relative to the pattern instructions. The
relevant data appear in Table 4 for each instruction. In three out of
four cases-questions pertaining to reasonable doubt are the excep-
tion-jurors who heard the revised instructions tended to make fewer
errors than jurors who heard pattern instructions, although statistical
significance was achieved only for questions about the limiting instruc-
tion.66 The results indicated, however, that deliberating jurors who
heard revised instructions achieved slightly higher comprehension
(20.8% errors over all thirty questions) than did deliberating jurors who
heard pattern instructions (25.4% errors). 67 This same pattern was sta-
tistically significant for questions pertaining to the limiting instruction
61 Z = 2.39, p < .02.
62 F (1,296) = 127.45, p < .001.
63 F (1,297) = 9.80, p = .002.
64 F (1,297) = 6.07, p = .014.
65 F (1,297) = 12.61, p < .001.
66 F (1,297) = 4.32, p = .039.




MEAN PERCENT ERRORS ON COMPREHENSION QUESTIONS






Limiting instruction 44.5a 3 6 .3 b
Reasonable doubt 23.5 25.2
Jurors' general duties 8.6 7.4
Overall 24.3 22.8
Note: Row means with different superscripts differ at .05 level of
significance.
when it was analyzed separately. 68 Thus, overall, the revised instruc-
tions did improve comprehension, especially when those instructions
were accompanied by an opportunity to deliberate.
. Ability to Appy Instructions
With regard to the ten questions measuring jurors' abilities to apply
the instructions to novel fact patterns, we predicted that the revised ver-
sions of the instructions would lead to more accurate applications of the
TABLE 5
MEAN LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH CORRECT





Limiting instruction 1. 15a 1.4 6 b
Reasonable doubt 1.68 1.81
Overall 1.07 1.22
Note: Higher numbers indicate more correct responding; row means
with different superscripts differ at .05 level of significance.
68 F (1,297) = 4.08, p = .044.
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law. Data on the mean level of agreement with the correct application
of these instructions are shown in Table 5, with responses coded so that
the closer a number is to +3, the greater the agreement with the correct
application of the law. Our findings demonstrate that jurors who heard
revised instructions tended to apply the instructions more accurately
than jurors who heard pattern instructions. Despite the consistent
trend, however, the only statistically significant effect for type of instruc-
tion was for the questions regarding the limiting instruction.6 9
As with our previous findings, jury sample (ex-jurors vs. current ju-
rors) and the opportunity to deliberate were important variables. For
example, ex-jurors agreed more often with correct applications of "rea-
sonable doubt" than current jurors.70 Across all ten scenarios, however,
this pattern held only for those jurors who did not deliberate; the mean
level of agreement for non-deliberating ex-jurors was 1.31, and for non-
deliberating current jurors, .97.71 Where jurors had been given an op-
portunity to deliberate, there was no difference in ex-jurors' and current
jurors' abilities to apply the law correctly. The impact of experiential
and educational differences between ex-jurors and current jurors thus
seemed to be reduced by the deliberation process.
5. Jurors' Subjective Impressions of the Judge's Instructions
A key objective in attempting to make jury instructions under-
standable is to ensure that the proper legal standards are applied con-
sistently to defendants in different trials. If instructions are not
understandable, verdicts will tend to be based on idiosyncratic features
of the trial or personal attitudes of the jurors rather than on the proper
legal standards. 72 We asked jurors to indicate how effective the judge's
instructions were in helping them to understand the law on a scale that
ranged from 1 (Not at all effective) to 5 (Extremely effective).
Current jurors who received revised instructions and then deliber-
ated perceived those instructions to be significantly more effective than
jurors in any of the other conditions. 73 Since current jurors were less
experienced and less well educated than ex-jurors, it appears likely that
69 F (1,297) = 4.81, p = .029.
70 Ex-jurors' mean = 1.90; current jurors' mean = 1.56. F (1,292) = 5.74, p = .017.
71 p < .05 by Newman-Keuls test. Overall jury sample X opportunity to deliberate inter-
action: F (1,288) = 4.84, p = .029. The Newman-Keuls test is a systematic procedure for
comparing all possible pairs of group means. For an explanation of the method of construct-
ing such tests, see B. WINER, STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES IN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 191-96 (2d
ed. 1971).
72 Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 19, at 478.
73 Mean response with revised instructions and deliberation = 3.84; with pattern instruc-
tions and deliberation, 3.34. Overall interaction: F (1,285) = 8.43, p = .004.
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current jurors were especially in need of simple and clear instructions in
order to understand the law, and, as a result, the revised instructions
were more effective for them than were the pattern instructions. Ex-
jurors, who were somewhat better educated and more experienced, ap-
parently benefited less from the simplified language of the revised in-
structions than did current jurors, with the result that there were no
significant differences between their perceived effectiveness of revised
and pattern instructions.
6 Deliberating Jurors' Subjective Impressions of Deliberations
For jurors who deliberated, variations in the instructions (revised
and pattern) and subject population (ex-jurors and current jurors) did
not affect either the extent to which jurors felt they had participated in
the deliberations, or ratings of the overall quality of the group
deliberations.
All groups indicated that they thought they had had about the
right amount of discussion concerning the instructions: on a scale rang-
ing from 1 (Preference for a lot less discussion of the instructions) to 3
(Preference for the same amount of discussion) to 5 (Preference for a lot,
more discussion), the overall mean response was 3.36. None of the ex-
perimental manipulations caused reliable variation from this mean.
7 Jurors' Paraphrases of SpeficJug, Instructions
In our final series of questions, we attempted to evaluate our jurors'
understanding of the judge's instructions by asking them to paraphrase
some of the concepts central to the instructions that they had heard at
the close of the trial.74 Each juror was asked to write an explanation of
the legal concepts "reasonable doubt" and "intent," and of the re-
stricted use of evidence of prior convictions. We then analyzed the writ-
ten responses to each term.75
As a basis for evaluating the jurors' understanding, the content of
each instruction was divided into units of meaning to provide a con-
venient list of essential legal components to which the paraphrase could
be compared. Although pattern and revised instructions were analyzed
separately, the content units for each were virtually identical. This simi-
larity was attributable to the fact that most of the revisions were syntac-
tical rather than semantic. Table 6 summarizes the component units of
meaning for each instruction. Each juror's paraphrases were compared
74 This idea sprang from the work of Charrow & Charrow, supra note 48.
75 Special thanks are extended to Ms. Jane Goodman for her assistance in performing this
analysis.
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with the component units of meaning of the given instructions and cate-
gorized as (a) essentially correct, (b) erroneous, or (c) ambiguous.
TABLE 6
COMPONENT UNITS OF MEANING FOR THREE TARGETED
LEGAL CONCEPTS, PRESENTED BY CONCEPT
Reasonable Doubt Intent
presumption of innocence act
doubt for reason purpose/objective
doubt in mind crime
reasonable person




abiding belief/remaining doubt weight/credibility/believe
innocence/guilt defendant's testimony
a. Reasonable doubt
Paraphrases were classified as essentially correct if they included
the minimum indication of doubt by an objective external standard; for
example, "That there is a reasonable chance there is doubt of a crime,"
or "A valid reason to doubt." By comparison, paraphrases were classi-
fied as ambiguous if it was unclear whether or not there was an articu-
lable standard for deciding on the evidence. Responses such as "Not
enough evidence," "The facts are not clear," or "Some aspect of the case
you are not sure about" fell into this category. Paraphrases that indi-
cated too rigorous an objective standard (e.g., "Not 100% evidence of
guilt," or "Absolute proof not present") or too subjective a standard
(e.g., "Guilty or not guilty in my mind and consciousness," or "What's
right in your mind") were rated as erroneous.
b. Intent
Correct paraphrases were easily discernible because of the small
number of component units of meaning. Examples of correct para-
phrases are "It is on your mind to commit a crime," or "Having the idea
in mind of doing something unlawful." We rated answers that failed to
mention an essential component (e.g., crime) as incorrect, despite the
fact that other components were accurately defined (e.g., "Will to do
right or wrong," "A preconception," or "Having consciously made a de-
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cision to do something or not to do something"). There were very few
ambiguous paraphrases of intent.
c. Prior conviction
Correct paraphrases included the essential components noted in
Table 6 (e.g., "Only as an aid in determining credibility," or "For
weighting truthfulness of testimony"). Incorrect paraphrases were of
three types. One type implied that the use of evidence of a prior convic-
tion was absolutely impermissible; another, that the use of such evidence
was proper on the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence; the third im-
plied that the juror had no grasp of the concept at all.
d. Findings
Paraphrase data are summarized in Table 7. The clearest findings,
appearing in the overall results of Table 7, were that correct paraphrases
outnumbered incorrect paraphrases when revised instructions were
given but not when pattern instructions were given. This result was
most pronounced for jurors who deliberated. 76 Such findings lend
strength to the pattern observed elsewhere in our results that revised
instructions accompanied by an opportunity to deliberate tend to en-
hance understanding.
Several collateral findings help to complete the picture. First, ju-
rors who did not deliberate tended to produce more purely subjective
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE OF CORRECT, INCORRECT, AND AMBIGUOUS
PARAPHRASE DEFINITIONS FOR REASONABLE




Deliberation 31.7 49.3 19.0
Pattern Instructions
No Deliberation 42.0 47.3 10.7
Revised Instructions
Deliberation 47.7 36.7 15.7
Revised Instructions
No Deliberation 45.7 43.7 10.7
76 While the trends are clear, these data were not significantly different.
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definitions of reasonable doubt than jurors who did deliberate, using
paraphrases such as "Guilty or not guilty in my mind and conscious-
ness," "You honestly believe the defendant guilty," or "What's right in
your mind." Second, jurors who receive revised instructions tended to
respond in less formal language and to use the first person more often,
suggesting that the use of simpler, more direct language promotes per-
sonal involvement and makes the task of jurors less abstract.
77
E. DISCUSSION
Several themes recur in our data. First, jurors with greater experi-
ence and learning apparently comprehend and apply jury instructions
better than those who are less experienced and/or less well educated.
This general finding is demonstrated in comparisons of the more exper-
ienced and better educated ex-jurors with the less experienced and less
well educated current jurors.
In addition to this basic tendency, there are effects due to the lan-
guage of the jury instructions and the opportunity to discuss legal con-
cepts in the course of deliberations. A fundamental trend that appears
throughout the data is the tendency for juror understanding to be en-
hanced when the language is relatively clear and when there is an oppor-
tunity to discuss legal concepts through deliberation. Thus, those who
deliberated after receiving revised instructions were found to better
comprehend the legal concepts. Furthermore, the paraphrased instruc-
tions of jurors who received revised instructions, followed by delibera-
tion, showed the highest percentage of correct responses.
Not surprisingly, the impact of clear language and an opportunity
to deliberate is greatest for those who initially seem at the greatest disad-
vantage-the relatively inexperienced, less well educated current jurors.
We found that it was current jurors, armed with revised instructions and
an opportunity to deliberate, who perceived the judge's instructions to
be most effective. Moreover, relative to current jurors, the advantage
that ex-jurors showed in applying the legal concepts to novel fact pat-
terns occurred only where there was no opportunity to deliberate.
Two of the three independent variables examined in this study af-
fected verdicts. First, less experienced current jurors tended to be more
lenient and also more certain than ex-jurors in reaching verdicts. This
finding is analogous to the finding of Kalven and Zeisel that judges, who
presumably have had a great deal of trial experience, are more apt to
77 Compare the following concrete paraphrase of the revised reasonable doubt instruction,
"If I have a doubt in my mind by the weight of the evidence, he or she is not guilty," with a
more abstract paraphrase of the pattern instruction, "Based on the evidence, the uncertainty
that a reasonable and prudent person would have about the guilt of the defendant."
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convict a defendant than are jurors who watch the same trial. 78 Our
data corroborate the inverse relationship between experience and leni-
ency. Second, jurors who deliberated tended to be more lenient than
jurors who did not deliberate. This finding suggests that the delibera-
tion process may expose jurors to additional reasons for doubting the
guilt of the defendant. At the very least, this result occurred for the
particular facts of the case used in our research. Third, and most nota-
bly, the variations in instructions did not affect verdicts reliably. Thus,
as a policy matter, it appears that the revisions we developed do not tip
the scales of justice for or against the defendant in comparison to the
language of the original pattern instructions. Inasmuch as the revised
instructions enhance jurors' understanding of relevant legal concepts
without biasing verdicts, our findings provide a clear basis for recom-
mending the use of these simplified jury instructions in actual trials.
This recommendation would, of course, require that the revised instruc-
tions maintain legal accuracy.
IV. RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIARY AND SUPERSIMPLIFIED
INSTRUCTIONS
At the onset of our research, a review of appellate cases indicated
that the wording of jury instructions is often fragile; minor variations in
wording may be the basis of reversals for error in instructing the jury.
Our initial efforts to revise the language of existing pattern instructions
thus were tempered by two concerns: first, that extensive alterations
from existing pattern instructions would be unacceptable to appeals-
conscious trial court judges; and, second, that appellate judges might
reject such substantially altered instructions as an excessive departure
from established precedents.
An informal sampling of approximately ten state trial judges' opin-
ions of our revised instructions, however, provided us with a different
message. The judges indicated that our initial revisions did not seem to
go far enough-that what was needed were instructions even more sim-
plified than those of our initial efforts. Based on this response, we un-
dertook to develop an even more simplified version of the targeted
instructions. By further refining our revised instructions and, in some
instances, reorganizing the format of instructions, we developed the
"supersimplified" instructions that appear in Table 8.
78 H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 109 (1966).
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TABLE 8
EXAMPLES OF SUPERSIMPLIFIED INSTRUCTIONS
[Vol. 75
Topic Supersimplified Instructions
Use of Prior You may not use evidence of a prior conviction to
Conviction to decide if the defendant is guilty in the current case. But,
Impeach a you may consider a prior conviction when evaluating a
Defendant defendant's credibility and how much weight to give his
(or her) testimony.
Intent A person acting with intent acts with the deliberate
purpose of accomplishing a crime. Intent can be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt by either direct or
circumstantial evidence.
Burden of The defendant pleads "not guilty." The defendant is
Proof; presumed to be innocent and need not prove his (or her)
Presumption innocence concerning any element of the crime. You must
of Innocence; wait until you have heard all the evidence before you
Reasonable come to a decision in this case.
Doubt The defendant's plea of "not guilty" means that the
state must prove each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt about guilt is not a
vague feeling or suspicion. It is a doubt that a reasonable
person has after carefully considering all of the evidence.
If you are satisfied that all of the elements of the crime
are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant "guilty." If you have a reasonable doubt about





You have three distinct duties as jurors in this case:
1) You must determine the facts in this case from the
testimony and evidence presented during the trial; 2) You
must accept and apply the law as I instruct you, regardless
of what you believe the law should be; 3) You must find
the defendant "guilty" or "not guilty" by applying the law
to the facts that you have determined.
First, to determine the facts in this case, you must
consider all of the evidence admitted in court. Evidence
consists of exhibits and testimony of witnesses. You must
not consider any evidence that I have not admitted.
Every party may benefit from evidence introduced by the
opposing party.
You are not to consider as evidence the mere fact that
the defendant has been accused. You are the sole judges









weight to give to the testimony of each witness. By law,
my personal opinions about the facts or evidence in this
case must not influence your judgment. I can offer some
suggestions to help you evaluate each witness' testimony:
(A) Consider the witness' ability to observe and remember
facts. Ask yourselves: Could the witness see or hear clearly
at the time? How accurate is the witness' memory?
(B) Consider the witness' manner and attitude when
testifying. Ask yourselves: Is the witness confident or
hesitant? Does the witness appear biased or prejudiced in
any way? How believable is the witness' testimony in light
of all the evidence?
Second, in accepting these instructions on the law,
consider the instructions as a whole. One instruction
should not take precedence over another. The order of the
instructions has no significance.
Third, in applying the law to the facts, remember that
the lawyer's remarks, statements and arguments are not
part of the evidence. They are intended to help you
understand the evidence and apply the law. Disregard
any remark, statement or argument which is not
supported by the evidence or my instructions.
Finally, you have absolutely nothing to do with the
punishment of a convicted defendant. The fact that
punishment may follow a conviction must not influence
your verdict, except that it may tend to make you careful.
Throughout your deliberation, do not allow sympathy or
prejudice to influence you. You are officers of the court
and must act fairly and with the sincere desire to
determine the proper verdict. To reach a verdict, your
decision must be unanimous.
Following the same procedures employed in our previous research,
we presented two groups of students at the University of Washington,
who were also registered voters, with the same videotaped burglary trial
previously used and then gave them either pattern instructions or the
supersimplified instructions. In this study, all subjects deliberated.
Our results showed no difference in comprehension between the
two groups, but there was one significant difference between the groups
in ability to apply the instructions to novel fact patterns: subjects who
received the supersimplified instructions performed better in applying
"reasonable doubt/presumption of innocence" than did subjects who re-
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ceived standard pattern instructions. 79
While this study explored the possibility that substantial simplifica-
tion of the language of pattern instructions may enhance juror under-
standing, it provided no basis for determining whether courts would be
willing to accept alternative versions of the instructions, either revised or
supersimplified, in actual trials. Our final study was directed toward
answering this question.
V. TRIAL JUDGES' EVALUATIONS OF ALTERNATIVELY WORDED
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Underlying our attempts to draft understandable jury instructions
was the concern that however clear to lay people our revised instructions
might be, unless they were accepted by trial judges, they might never see
their day in court. Because trial judges ultimately choose which instruc-
tions will be given to jurors, we decided to survey state court judges
currently sitting throughout the United States to determine how they
rated the language of the revised, supersimplified, and existing pattern
instructions.
A. METHODOLOGY
In this study, 435 state superior court judges randomly selected
from across the country were asked to complete a questionnaire de-
signed to measure the legal adequacy and probable acceptance of our
linguistic revisions in relation to the pattern instructions.8 0 Each judge
was sent one of four versions of our questionnaire. Mailing was done
randomly so that each of the four versions was distributed evenly
throughout the country.
Three versions of the questionnaire were quite similar (i.e., the
"pattern," "revised," and "supersimplified" versions). In each version,
the judges were asked to evaluate three instructions: intent, reasonable
doubt/presumption of innocence, and the limiting instruction. These
instructions were presented in either their pattern form, the revised form
that we had developed in the earlier phases of this research, or the super-
simplified form that was an attempt to radically simplify the language
of the instructions. We asked several questions about each instruction,
including:
79 F (1,50) = 4.14, p = .047.
80 We obtained a list of the names and addresses of all superior court judges in the United
States. We thank the Honorable James E. Noe, King County Superior Court, for making this
list available to us. Using a map of the United States that had been divided into Congres-
sional districts, we placed each judge in his or her respective Congressional district, and then
randomly selected one judge from each of the 435 districts.
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1. In your opinion, is this instruction a legally adequate statement
of the law?
2. How effective do you think the instruction will be in conveying
the intended legal concepts to the jury?
3. What, if any, aspects of the instruction do you find particularly
helpful or troublesome?
4. Overall, would you consider this a proper instruction to give to
a jury?
5. Do you perceive bias favoring either party in the language of
this instruction?
The fourth version of our questionnaire had a different format.
Here, a judge was given all three forms (i.e., pattern, revised, and super-
simplified) of a particular instruction, and then asked to rank-order the
instructions along these lines:
1. Rank the instructions as legally adequate statements of the law
in your jurisdiction. Which do you most prefer? Which do you least
prefer?
2. Rank the instructions as to their effectiveness in conveying the
intended legal concepts to a jury.
3. Rank the instructions as to the least amount of bias favoring
either party in the language of the instruction.
4. Overall, which instruction would you choose to give to the
jury?
5. What, if any, aspects of each instruction do you find particu-
larly helpful or troublesome?
Overall, we received responses from 133 judges or 31% of the sam-
ple. Of these, 110 (25%) completed the questionnaire; others gave us
only their comments or informed us that they tried civil cases exclu-
sively. Of those responding, 22% answered the pattern version, 26% an-
swered the revised version, 33% answered the supersimplified version,
and 19% answered the comparison questionnaire.
B. RESULTS
. Intent Instruction
Overall, judges preferred the revised version of the intent instruc-
tion over the pattern and supersimplified forms. When asked, "Is this
instruction a legally adequate statement of the law?" more judges an-
swered affirmatively for the revised version than for the other intent in-
structions.81 For those judges who rank-ordered the three versions of
81 On a scale from -2 to +2 where -2 = Positively no and +2 = Positively yes, the mean
response to the revised version was .77; to the pattern version, .48; and to the supersimplified
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intent according to their legal adequacy, the revised form was most
preferred.
82
In response to the question, "How effective do you think this in-
struction will be in conveying the intended legal concepts to the jury?"
the revised version of intent received the highest mean score,8 3 although
judges who ranked the three instructions comparatively on the basis of
perceived effectiveness did not differ significantly in their rankings of the
three versions. When judges were asked which of the three versions they
would prefer to give to the jury, however, the revised version was most
preferred.
8 4
In terms of the perceived bias inherent in the three versions of the
intent instruction, the revised instruction was viewed as slightly more
biased in favor of the prosecution, but the scores did not differ signifi-
cantly for the pattern or supersimplifed forms.8 5 This slight prosecution
bias possibly can be attributed to the fact that the revised instruction
included this statement: Intent can be proved by either direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence.
2. Reasonable Doubt/Presumption of Innocence
Like the intent instruction, the revised version of the reasonable
doubt instruction was clearly favored by judges. Among judges who
rated only one version, the revised instruction was given the highest
mean score in terms of its legal adequacy 86 and was thought to be some-
version, -. 28. Chi-square = 21.44, 8df, p = .006. The chi-square is used to determine
whether a systematic relationship exists between two variables. This is done by arranging the
data in a 2X2 table. The cell frequencies that would be expected were there no relationship
between the variables are compared to the actual cell frequencies. The greater the discrepan-
cies between the expected and actual frequencies, the larger the chi-square. The degrees of
freedom (do vary with the number of cells in the table.
82 On a ranking scale where 1 = Most preferred version and 3 = Least preferred version,
the mean rank for the revised version = 1.76; for the pattern version = 2.38; and for the
supersimplified version = 1.86. Friedman ANOVA on rank-order data, chi-square = 4.67,
2df, p = .09. The Friedman analysis of variance (ANOVA) by ranks is a statistical test to
determine whether rank sums for different instructions, for example, differ at some predeter-
mined level of significance (usually p < .05).
83 On a scale from 0 to 4 where 0 = Not at all effective, and 4 = Extremely effective, the
revised instruction = 1.90; pattern instruction = 1.42; supersimplified instruction = 1.42.
Chi-square = 17.07, 8df, p = .03.
84 On a scale from I to 3 where 1 = Most preferred version, and 3 = Least preferred
version, mean rank for revised intent instruction = 1.68; pattern instruction = 2.47; supersim-
plified instruction = 1.84. Friedman ANOVA chi-square = 6.63, 2df, p = .04.
85 On a scale from -3 to +3 where -3 = strong defense bias, 0 = no bias, and +3 = strong
prosecution bias, the mean score for revised instruction = .63; pattern instruction = -. 16;
supersimplified instruction = .13. Not significant by chi-square.
86 On a scale from -2 to +2, the revised instruction = .73; pattern = 0; supersimplified =
.34. Chi-square = 12.47, 8df, p = .13.
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what more effective at conveying the intended legal concepts to a jury.8 7
The judges who saw all three versions and then ranked the instructions
produced similar results. The revised version tended to be preferred on
the dimension of legal adequacy,88 and was seen as most effective in
communicating the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.8 9 In re-
sponse to the question, "Would you consider this a proper instruction to
give to the jury?" the revised version received more affirmative votes9°
and was ranked as the most preferred form of the instruction. 9 1 Finally,
in terms of the perceived bias of each version, the pattern instruction
was thought to be slightly more biased in favor of the prosecution, 92 and




The judges found very few differences among the three versions of
the limiting instruction. Although the revised limiting instruction re-
ceived a slightly higher score for legal adequacy than did the other two
versions, this difference was not statistically significant. However, there
was a difference in the perceived effectiveness of the instructions, and
here the revised instruction received the highest mean score.94 For the
questions, "Would you consider this a proper instruction to give to the
jury?" and "Do you perceive bias favoring either party in the language
of this instruction?" there were no statistically significant differences in
judges' responses. Also, there were no differences in the rankings of the
revised, pattern, and supersimplified instructions from judges who read
all three versions and ranked the instructions in order of preference.
87 On a scale from 0 to 4, revised instruction = 2.19; pattern instruction = 1.48; supersim-
plified instruction = 2.03. Chi-square = 11.74, 8df, p = .16.
88 On a scale from 1 to 3, mean rank for revised instruction = 1.63; patten = 2.11; super-
simplified = 2.26. Friedman ANOVA chi-square = 4.11, 2df, p = .12.
89 On a scale from 1 to 3, mean rank for revised instruction = 1.56; pattern = 2.17; super-
simplified = 2.28. Friedman ANOVA chi-square = 5.44, 2df, p = .06.
90 On a scale from -1 to +1 where -1 = No, this is not a proper instruction, and +1 =
Yes, this is a proper instruction, the revised version = .42; pattern version = -. 28; supersim-
plified version = .19. Chi-square = 9.35, 4df, p = .05.
91 On a scale from I to 3, mean rank for revised instruction = 1.47; for pattern = 2.29; for
supersimplified = 2.24. Friedman ANOVA chi-square = 7.18, 2df, p = .03.
92 On a scale from -3 to +3, revised instruction = .33; pattern = .52; supersimplified = .32.
Chi-square = 16.04, lOdf, p = .09.
93 On a scale from 1 to 3, mean rank for revised = 1.50; pattern = 2.25; supersimplified -
2.25. Friedman ANOVA chi-square = 6.00, 2df, p = .09.
94 On a scale from 0 to 4, where 0 = Not at all effective, and 4 = Extremely effective,
revised version = 2.54; pattern version - 2.08; supersimplified version = 1.92. Chi-square =
16.70, 8df, p = .03.
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VI. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The strategy of the studies reported in this Article was (a) to iden-
tify certain criminal jury instructions that are difficult for jurors to un-
derstand, yet are crucial and used frequently in most jurisdictions; (b) to
develop alternative language that would improve jurors' understanding;
(c) to validate the use of the alternative language in a setting and with
juror participants that approximate those of actual trials; and (d) to
present information on trial judges' reactions to the alternatively
worded instructions. The result is a set of alternatively worded instruc-
tions that both enhanced juror understanding and received favorable
ratings by the trial judges included in our sample. We believe the re-
vised language of the pattern instructions is appropriate for use in actual
court cases and will preserve legal accuracy while also enhancing com-
munication with jurors.
Although the findings generally seem clear, one caveat is in order.
This concerns the notion of external validity, or the extent to which
results of any experimental research can be generalized to other persons
and situations. Because the experimental situation we used to test un-
derstanding of the pattern and revised instructions did not mirror ex-
actly the conditions of an actual trial (for example, the trial was
presented on videotape and thus not viewed live, our jurors were aware
that their verdicts were not binding, and their deliberation time was
limited), we must be cautious about overgeneralizing from the favorable
results of these studies.95
There is, however, room for cautious optimism. First, results from
the archival study enabled us to select jury instructions for revision that
were indeed problematic-these instructions were frequently used but
difficult for jurors to understand. Second, we tested our revised instruc-
tions in a setting that closely resembled that of a real trial, and we used
actual jurors as our subjects. This closer approximation to reality is cer-
tainly an improvement over jury simulation studies of the past.96 Fi-
nally, results from the trial judges' survey demonstrated that the
language changes we proposed were acceptable to those trial judges who
responded and were thought to communicate effectively crucial infor-
95 For a general critique of jury simulation studies, see Simulation Research and the Law, 3
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1979).
96 The resemblance of our simulation to a real trial was close, but still not complete. For
example, jurors did not participate in voir dire--a portion of the trial in which counsel asks
questions of potential jurors that relate to the law. However, mock jurors did hear closing
arguments, in which counsel has the opportunity to argue and explain the law, interpreting
legal issues so as to favor his or her side. Given the inevitably biased interpretations, the court




mation to jurors. In many respects, the judges' evaluations provide the
best test of the external validity of our research and lend confidence to
the view that our findings are generalizable to actual jury trials and will
improve jurors' understanding of their instructions.
As a policy matter, it is important to examine whether changes in
the language of jury instructions such as those presented here are likely
to affect verdicts. If, for example, verdicts of guilty dramatically in-
crease or decrease as the result of language variations, we could assume
that simplified language somehow was shifting the decision criteria used
by jurors away from existing standards. The data reported here, how-
ever, showed reliable effects on verdicts of deliberation (i.e., those who
deliberated were more likely to acquit) and of juror sample (i.e., less
experienced jurors were more likely to acquit), but no reliable effects of
instruction variations. These results suggest an interactive effect of jury
instructions, such that jurors who have an opportunity to deliberate and
who have little jury experience at the outset benefit the most from sim-
plified language. In short, it appears that linguistic improvements in the
instructions do not shift jurors' decision criteria relative to pattern in-
structions, though they do help jurors to comprehend and apply the in-
structions to facts more accurately.
More broadly, our results suggest that lawyers and judges need not
despair that juries sometimes seem ill equipped to understand and apply
the law. Our findings demonstrate that simplified language and organ-
ized presentations of legal concepts can effectively help jurors, particu-
larly when coupled with the opportunity to discuss and deliberate.
Proper attention to devising jury instructions that are meaningful to lay
people, as well as legally accurate, can accomplish the important task of
informing jurors of the relevant legal concepts.
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